ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
WiMAX, the Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, defined by the IEEE standard as 802.16, is a telecommunications technology that provides wireless and broadband data transmission with high bandwidth and transmission rates between point-to-point links and full mobile cellular access. IEEE 802.16-2004 supports fixed and nomadic nodes whereas IEEE802.16e-2005 the Mobile WiMAX standard derived from Fixed WiMAX supports mobile nodes. IEEE 802.16e works in 2.3 GHz and 2.5 GHz frequency bands utilising PKM V2 key management protocol to protect the network from illicit access. The security architecture of WiMAX 802.16e is in Figure. 1.
The overall network may be logically divided into three parts: i. Mobile Stations (MS) or subscriber station (SS) used by the end user .i.e. the mobile devices that would like to join the Mobile WiMAX network. ii. The access service network (ASN) comprising one or more base stations and ASN gateways that form the radio access network at the edge. The ASN interfaces the BS and all-IP core network. The ASN manages radio resources, MS access, mobility, security and QoS. It acts as a relay to CSN for IP address allocation and AAA functions. iii. Connectivity service network (CSN) provides IP connectivity and all the IP core network functions. The CSN performs policy and admission control, IP address allocation, settlement and billing. CSN hosts the Mobile IP Home Agent, Authorization, Authentication and Accounting (AAA) servers, and Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and VoIP gateways. The CSN is also accountable for internetworking with non-WiMAX networks.
Figure.1. WiMAX Security Architecture
From security point of view, IEEE 802.16e-2005 has advanced security features compared to IEEE 802.16e-2004. It uses privacy key management protocol version 2 (PKM V2) whereas the latter uses PKM version 1. In IEEE 802.16 using PKMv1, Authorization Request message includes only the contents for SS authentication. When SS tries to establish a connection to BS, the authorization process based on RSA authentication protocol allows only BS to authenticate SS in PKMv1. There is no way to confirm whether the BS is authorized or not.. Thus, it is possible to masquerade as a Rogue BS after eavesdropping authentication related message from SS. However, in the case of Mobile WiMAX using PKMv2, possibility of Rogue BS attack is reduced. Because mutual authentication function between SS and BS is obligatory during authorization process. Also PKM V2 allows both mutual and unilateral authentication. Also it enables periodic re-authentication/reauthorization and key update. The PKMv2 provides a Message authentication scheme using HMAC or CMAC, device/user authentication using EAP methods, and confidentiality using (Advanced Encryption Scheme in counter with cipher block chaining mode) AES-CCM encryption algorithm. However, there is no guarantee that PKMv2-based Mobile WiMAX network will not have security flaws. PKMV2 based on RSA makes up for the shortcomings of PKMV1, but it does not imply that PKMV2 is absolutely safe, i.e. new attacks may occur. When an MS is switching from one sector to another, the key space is vulnerable i.e., AKs (Authentication key) and TEKs (Traffic Encryption Key) are vulnerable to brute-force attack, Men in the middle attack, replay and Denial of service etc. Therefore this paper focuses on these security vulnerabilities and analyses the memory requirement for key storage and propose their counter measures according to each network domain together with the compression of keys for improved security of the Mobile WiMAX network. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, Mobile WiMAX security is analysed considering various security attacks and vulnerabilities in the network. In section 3, solutions are proposed and algorithms are analysed. Finally section4 results are analysed and section 5 is concluded with a summary and discussion of future works.
VULNERABILITIES IN IEEE 802.16
With the publication of the Mobile WiMAX amendment, most of the vulnerabilities were solved in WiMAX. This section explains an assortment of vulnerabilities found in Mobile WiMAX. The security of IEEE 802.16e was only analyzed by a few papers and [1] examined the 3-way TEK exchange and the authorization process and could not find any security leak. Also [2] analyzed the key management protocol using protocol analyzing software and did not detect any problem. But [3] shows, in mobile WiMAX there are some unauthenticated and unencrypted management messages which threat the reliability of the system. These vulnerabilities are due to 
Unencrypted Management Messages
Most of the management messages defined in IEEE 802.16e are integrity protected. This is done by a hash or cipher based message authentication code (HMAC/CMAC) [4] . A couple of management messages are sent over the broadcast management connection. However, some messages are not covered by any authentication mechanism. In WiMAX security architecture, there is no common key for the authentication of Broad casted management messages. An adversary collecting management information can create detailed profiles about MS including the capabilities of devices and security settings associated with the base stations. Using the data offered in power reports, registration, ranging and handover messages, a listening adversary is able to determine the movement and approximate position of the MS. IEEE 802.16 standard defines only a set of functions between SS and BS. It means that the security architecture given by IEEE 802.16 standards does not cover intra-ASN and ASN-to-CSN communication [5] [7] . So these domains become insecure and are illustrated in power settings, vendor information, MS's capabilities etc are exchanged. However, specifically, the SBC negotiation parameters and PKM security contexts do not have any security measures to keep their confidentiality. The possibility of exposure to malicious users or outer network always exists in initial network entry process. [6] Even though Mobile WiMAX has a message authentication scheme using HMAC/CMAC codes and traffic encryption scheme using AES-CCM based on PKMv2, the security schemes are only applied to normal data traffic after initial network entry process, not to control messages during initial network entry. An attacker can easily access the security information by listening on the channel.
Initial network entry consists of four processes: Initial Ranging process, SS Basic Capability (SBC) negotiation process, PKM authentication process, and registration process. Initial network entry is the most security sensitive processes in Mobile WiMAX network as it is the first gate to establish a connection to the network. Also many physical parameters, performance factors, and security contexts between SS and serving BS are determined during this process. The initial network process and MS Basic Capability negotiation is illustrated in Figure 3 . After initial network entry, the management communication over the basic and primary management connections remains unencrypted (described earlier in section 2.1). As most of the management messages are sent on these connections, nearly all management information exchanged between MS and BS can be accessed by a listening adversary. Hellman, possibility for Man in the middle attack makes the network scrawny by eavesdropping, interception and interruption of the management messages, resulting in a breach in the reliability of the entire network as it involves the transmission of unencrypted management messages. Also there is no appropriate method to secure the critical information. Hence it results in lack of confidentiality. To overcome this, it is proposed to modify the Diffie Hellman key exchange process by including Hash based authentication as illustrated in Figure. 4.
When MS is powered on, it firsts scans the downlink channel to determine whether it is currently in the coverage of base station. Each MS stores the list of optional parameters, such as DL frequency. MS synchronizes with the stored DL frequency of the suitable BS. Once the DL synchronization is completed, MS can listen to various control messages, from which it obtains the UL parameters. Based on these UL parameters, MS decides whether the channel is suitable or not. If the channel is suitable MS performs ranging, otherwise it again starts scanning the channel. Ranging process acquires timing and power level adjustment to maintain the UL connection with the BS. BS sends a set of ranging codes to the subscriber station for synchronization. Initial ranging procedure is started when SS receives UL-MAP message including ranging codes. In the proposed model SS selects any one of the ranging codes say RC n where RC n =C a C b . If the ranging code contains two parts, SS selects any one part and sends the hashed value of the ranging code together with this. On reception BS compares the received ranging code part with the pool of ranging codes and identifies the corresponding complete ranging code. Then it hashes the ranging code and compares it with the received hashed ranging code. If it matches, common key will be shared through Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Else it will be declared as unauthorised user and access will be denied. Once the SS is authorized in further steps, it generates other global variable "g" and public/private key pair and then sends them to BS.BS receives a public key of SS and global variables (prime number and its primitive root). If the received key and variables are verified, BS also sends his public key to SS. Thus BS and SS can share Diffie-Hellman global variables and public key with each other through initial ranging process securely. With this key exchange, shared common key called "pre-TEK" is generated which could be used for further encryption of ranging messages for secure communication. Therefore, the proposed method protects the SBC security parameters and PKM security contexts using the shared traffic encryption key (pre-TEK) during initial network entry procedure. The algorithm for this process is illustrated in Figure.5a , 5b. 
Figure.5a Algorithm-Modified Initial Network Entry Process

Modified Access Network Security
PKM security architecture covers only the traffic between mobile station and base station. WiMAX Forum assumes that ASN network is trusted and AAA connections between ASN and CSN may be protected with IPSec tunnel. However, there are a lot of possibilities for new security holes to happen including various zero-day attacks. Moreover, IPSec requires additional software and hardware facilities for supporting whole Mobile WiMAX domains. So this paper proposes a device certificate based key exchange method. All devices in mobile WiMAX network have device certificate. Also, it is assumed that all devices are certified by public authority and certificates can be verified through certificate chain. All devices have a certificate chain together with their own certificate. It is illustrated in Figure. 6 and the algorithm is illustrated in Figure. BS and ASN-GW should generate a secret session key in order to exchange message with ASN-GW and CSN. BS, ASN-GW, and CSN have the certificate chain. To exchange message, BS encrypts the message with session key generated (ASN-TEK) padded with the time stamp and the authority certificate. A common key would not completely protect the integrity of the message as the key shared by the mobile station can be generated by unauthenticated BS. Consequently in addition with the encrypted message, the session key is also encrypted with the public key of ASN-GW and padded with the message. When ASN-GW receives the message it verifies the authority certificate and then checks the timestamp for validity. On successful verification ASN-GW decrypts the message and ASN-TEK key. ASN-GW replies by encrypting the connection reply message with the ASN-TEK padded with the authority certificate. Similarly for Connectivity service network, CSN-TEK is generated as common encryption key. Thus the secret session key eliminates the insecurity existing between BS-ASN-GW and ASN-GW-CSN. Hence a secure communication is established. To enhances the security and to reduce the authentication cost the session key is compressed (compression explained in section 3.2) and then transferred.
Authentication Cost Reduction
Any secured system can be modelled as a capability-based access control system in which each user is given a set of secret keys to access the granted resources. In resource-constrained devices, the design is sensitive to memory or key storage cost. Data compression saves the transmission time and disk space and more importantly it strengthens the cryptographic security. To crack the cipher, cryptanalysis utilises the pattern found in the plain text. Compression reduces these patterns in the plaintext, thereby increasing the resistance towards cryptanalysis. With a goal to minimize the maximum users' key storage and to enhance security, this paper proposes compression of the cryptographic key. In case of access network security the transferred key is encrypted whereas the buffer space required still remains the same. To reduce this, the transferred key is compressed through Huffman key compression technique and then encrypted for transmission. Huffman coding is an entropy encoding algorithm used for lossless data compression. It uses variable-length code table for encoding. Huffman coding results in prefix code for representing each symbol i.e. the bit string representing some particular symbol is never a prefix of the bit string representing any other symbol. Huffman compression expresses the most common source symbols using shorter strings of bits than are used for less common source symbols. Figure. 9. Database -Key storage BS compresses ASN-TEK then encrypt and pad it with the encrypted request timestamp and the authority certificate, and send it to ASN-GW.ASN-GW verifies the timestamp and certificate and then decrypt and later on decompress the message. The same procedure is repeated for message transaction in connectivity service network. All the keys are stored in the centralised authority's database as shown in Figure.9 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The developed IEEE 802.16e mobile WiMAX model using Qualnet , shown in Figure. It indicates the authentication procedure using Hash based entity verification and Diffie Hellman Key exchange. The Base Station selects and sends three ranging codes to MS.MS selects the first code and compute the hash value and send it back to BS together with its public key. BS after verifying the identity authenticates the MS and sends it public key. With these keys both generate a common session key individually. It has been shown in the result that both the keys generated at BS and MS are identical. With this proposed approach the computation time increases from 0.4840s to 0.8110s and thereby increases the computational effort and security. Figure. 11.Generated Matlab GUI-Initial Network Entry Procedure
In case of access network security since the authentication in based on device certificate, each user holds the certificate chain as shown in Figure. 11, issued by the authority from which each user and BS can verify the authenticity of other users. Figure. 12.Generated Matlab GUI-Certificate Pool Figure. 13.Generated MATLAB GUI-Modified Access Network Security Figure. 13 represents the MATLAB generated GUI for the proposed access network security. It shows the various session keys and their compressed counterpart. AUTH_CERT represents the device certificate used for the authentication of the entities. REQUEST and RESPONSE indicates the connection request and response to and fro the entities which includes the encrypted message, key, certificate and the timestamp.
The compression results are discussed below in Figure. 14.Results shows that the actual key size 32 hexa digits in reduced to 14(ASN_TEK) , 15(CSN_TEK).This reduces the memory and bandwidth required for key storage and transmission and hence the authentication cost. The compression concept has been implemented for multiple users and the resultant graph is shown in Figure. 15. For 32 hex bit data compression reduces the key size varying from 5 to 16 bits. Assuming an average of 10 to 15 bits reduction for single user the graph has been plotted. From the graph it has been identified that without compression total buffer space required for 10 users is 160 bytes. But compression reduces this to more than 50% i.e.63 bytes. Compression increases the computation time to 0.2650s. When the proposed work is done without compression the computation time is 0.2340s whereas under existing approach it is 0.1870s. Even though the computational time increases, computational effort is also increased on the other hand. From the results it has been identified that compression reduces the memory and hence the bandwidth to a minimum of 50%. Figure. 14.Generated Matlab GUI-Compression Result Figure. 15. Compression analysis.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
WiMAX has taken WMAN networks to next level. It is therefore vital to explore and perk up the security aspects of such a future generation network. So this paper proposes authentication of management communication and compression as a key to improve the security of the WiMAX network. This approach reduces the possibility for Man in the middle attack, scrambling, jamming and thereby increases the security of the network. Further compression reduces the key size, saves the transmission time and disk space and more importantly it strengthens the cryptographic security. Result shows that compression reduces key buffer space to a minimum of 50% and provides ample reduction in the bandwidth. For further enhancement, our work will also be implemented in hardware using FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array). 
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